Night Engagement at Empress Augusta Bay — 1943

These videos, from the Naval Archives in Washington, DC, are made available through the kind cooperation of Bolling Smith of the Coast Defense Study Group — thank you very much.

This film tells things most people do not know about how hard it was at night to keep up with all of the forces involved. It tells it like it was and points out mistakes that were really pretty common — things that just happened and were really hard to avoid. Archive reference: MN-3744 / ARC 12971.

The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, fought on 1–2 November 1943 — also known as the Battle of Gazelle Bay and in Japanese sources as the Sea Battle of Bougainville Bay Shore — was a naval engagement near the island of Bougainville. It resulted from Allied landings on Bougainville as the opening action of the Bougainville campaign and was part of the broader Solomons and New Guinea campaigns. The battle formed a key element of Operation Cartwheel, the Allied strategy aimed at isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul. The objective was to establish a beachhead and build an airfield within range of Rabaul.

Empress Augusta Bay lies south of Cape Torokina on Bougainville’s west coast. When word reached Rabaul on 31 October 1943 of an Allied force steaming up “The Slot,” Admiral Omori’s Cruiser Division 5 — heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro — had just finished escorting a convoy from Truk and was promptly ordered to intercept. Omori missed Merrill’s Task Force 39, but the next day elements of III Amphibious Corps began landings at Cape Torokina.

The Americans were learning lessons from previous costly night engagements. It was a moonless, very dark night. At 0130 an American plane bombed Haguro and inflicted light damage. Japanese float planes spotted Merrill’s force but badly underestimated it. Both Omori and Merrill maneuvered to intercept. Merrill moved at a deliberate 20 knots to reduce the visibility of his ships’ wakes and had an excellent radar picture of Omori’s movements. His plan was to keep the Japanese well out to sea at the estimated maximum range of Japanese torpedoes (16,000–20,000 yards) while his destroyers raced in independently with torpedoes.

One of his destroyer division commanders was Arleigh Burke — for whom a class of our most modern destroyers is named — who was well acquainted with these tactics. His other division commander, B.L. Austin, was new to the theater. Omori sailed in three columns with cruisers in the center and destroyers on either flank. He had radar but it was poor quality, his operators were badly trained, and he relied entirely on visual sightings — his undoing.

The Americans acquired Omori on radar at 0227 on 2 November. At 0231 Burke’s destroyers broke free and raced north to attack the enemy flank with torpedoes. At 0239 Merrill reversed course. At 0245 Omori sighted the Americans, turned southwest, and launched torpedoes. Merrill opened gunfire. All of Merrill’s cruisers concentrated on the nearest large target — Sendai — which was smothered by shells and began burning fiercely. Japanese destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu collided while chasing salvos and withdrew. Merrill made smoke and changed course, foiling all Japanese torpedo and gun solutions.

Omori maneuvered to avoid gunfire — turning a complete 360 degrees — making an excellent target. Hatsukaze stumbled into the heavy cruiser column and collided with Myoko, suffering severe damage. Haguro took minor hits; Denver suffered light damage from return fire. Japanese float planes dropped flares that brightly illuminated the American ships. At 0337 Omori, believing mistakenly that he had inflicted heavy damage, ordered a withdrawal.

Burke became disoriented and chased the retreating Japanese destroyers before realizing his error and reversing course. His ships helped finish off Hatsukaze before rejoining Merrill at daybreak. Austin was unable to deliver torpedoes before the cruisers opened fire, and one of his ships misinterpreted signals and raced off on her own before correcting course — but not before taking a torpedo hit in the stern. Thatcher and Spence suffered a grazing collision; Spence also took a shell hit that contaminated her fuel. The surface action ended by 0454.

Shortly after 0800 Merrill was attacked by 100 Japanese carrier aircraft from Rabaul. The attack was badly coordinated, American antiaircraft fire was effective, and fighter support was available — damage was limited to two superficial hits on Montpelier. From Sendai, 320 men were lost including her commanding officer; Admiral Ijuin was rescued. Merrill suffered 19 killed and 26 wounded.

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